In a recent interview on Steve Bannon’s “War Room,” Garland Favorito, the founder of VoterGA, gave an in-depth analysis of the recent Halderman Report detailing critical vulnerabilities in the election voting machines used in Georgia.
Favorito’s comments underscore growing concerns about the security and integrity of electronic voting systems.
During the interview, Favorito cited the report’s findings: “The ICX suffers from critical vulnerabilities that can be exploited to subvert all of its security mechanisms,” referring to a model or type of ballot-marking device used in the voting process.
He elaborated on the potential fallout, noting that these weaknesses could be used to “alter voters’ votes while subverting all of the procedural protections practiced by the state.”
Dr. Alex Halderman, the report’s author and a recognized expert in the field, is known for his independence.
According to Favorito, “he leans far more on the Democrat side than the Republican.”
Yet, he has no vested interest in the political battle over voting machines, being primarily concerned with ensuring secure elections.
Favorito described how Dr. Halderman demonstrated that attackers could manipulate the system: “He found that attackers can alter the QR codes on the printed ballots to modify voter selections… the system does not accumulate what the voter actually can see on text.”
“QR” is short for “Quick Response” codes, two-dimensional barcodes that can be scanned to quickly access information or a website via a smartphone or other reader device.
This system vulnerability, he said, is a serious concern since “the QR code contains the votes.”
The Halderman report also found that an October 2020 software update left Georgia’s ballot-marking devices vulnerable.
“Anyone can install malware with only brief physical access to the machines,” Favorito said, pointing out that this weakness could even be exploited by non-technical voters.
Favorito went on to mention the potential for widespread compromise.
“Attackers could exploit this to spread malware to all ballot marking devices across the county or the entire state,” he said.
Favorito highlighted a disturbing case from 2017, where the Secretary of State’s Election Management Server was exposed to the Internet, making it accessible to virtually anyone.
Dr. Halderman’s report concludes that despite the addition of a paper trail, malware can still change individual votes and most election outcomes without detection.
“Using vulnerable ICX BMDs for all in-person voters, as Georgia does, greatly magnifies the security risk,” Favorito said, echoing Dr. Halderman’s words.
At another point in the interview, Favorito emphasized the urgent need for increased security and transparency in the voting process.
He warned against complacency, stating that “it is very likely that there are other equally critical flaws that are yet to be discovered,” and that “attackers only have to find one of the flaws.”
Favorito’s revelations have stoked concerns about the security of electronic voting systems.
It remains to be seen how these findings will influence the ongoing debate about voting security in the United States.
You can read the full report below:
